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NOTES
Taxable Status of Reimbursement of Items Previously Deducted *
Cases have frequently arisen where there is involved a reimbursement of
a bad debt, loss or expense item or a refund or reduction in the amount of taxes,
which has been allowed as a deduction from gross income in a prior year. The
problem thus presented is the manner in which this refund or reimbursement or
reduction is to be treated. Is it to be included in gross income for the year in
which it is received by the taxpayer? Or is the deduction to be disallowed?
And what effect does the running of the statute of limitations for making additional assessments have on this problem? The question is an important one and
is marked by disagreement in court and Board of Tax Appeals decisions and in
rulings of the Treasury Department. The purpose of this discussion is to point
out particular problems that not infrequently arise and to attempt to clarify the
subject as much as possible.
A. Recovery of a Debt Previously Deducted as Bad
The Treasury Regulations provide that "any amount subsequently received
on account of a bad debt or on account of a bad debt previously charged off and
allowed as a deduction for income tax purposes, must be included in gross income
for the taxable year in which received". 1 This rule has been followed with uniformity by both the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts. Thus, the Board has
held where the taxpayer in 1914 charged off the account of a corporation which
had been declared bankrupt and in 1923 received money for this by terms of the
will of the sole shareholder of the corporation, this recovery constituted income
for J923.2 Where taxpayer charged off accounts as worthless in 1916 and in
1918 collected the amount from debtor, the inclusion of said amount in gross
income for 1918 was held proper.3 The courts have also adhered to the proposition that any later collection of a debt allowed as a deduction in a previous
year as worthless must be returned as income. 4
When there is recovery of a debt improperly deducted as bad, there is some
question as to whether the recovery may be treated as income in the year in which
received. In Commissioner v. Liberty Bank Trust Co.,5 the Circuit Court of
Appeals held the amount recovered is chargeable to income for the years in which
received, reversing the Board 6 which had held that the recovery should be
accounted for by disallowance of the deduction, on the theory that understatement
of income in a previous year should not be made the basis of increasing income
in a current year. The Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision 7 declared that
the taxpayer was estopped to deny the truth of the statement as to the
• The writer is indebted to Professor Paul W. Bruton for invaluable advice in the preparation of this article.
1. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 23 (k)-i (1936).

(1936).

See also, U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 42-1

2. Excelsior Printing Co., i6 B. T. A. 886 (1929).
3. Iberville Wholesale Grocery Co., 17 B. T. A. 235 (1929) ; see also, First National Bank
of Key West, 26 B. T. A. 370, 378 (1932); Asldn & Marine Co., 26 B. T. A. 409 (1932),
aff'd 66 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
4. Carr v. Commissioner, 28 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); Nott-Atwater Co. v.
Poe, 33 F. (2d) iooo (W. D. Wash. 1928), aff'd per cur. 42 F. (2d) ioi8 (C. C. A. 9th,
193o); Putnam Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 5o F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
5. 59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
6. 14 B. T. A. 1428 (1929).
7. 59 F. (2d) 320 at 325 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
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worthlessness of the debt in previous years to the prejudice of the government,
and even if taxpayer is not estopped, the amounts received were chargeable to
income under the principle announced in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.8 In
a later case, the Board was again faced with this problem and without discussion
of its former position, held that the recovery of a debt improperly deducted was
income, and this decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
B. Reimbursement of Expenses Previously Deducted
The view generally taken as to the reimbursement of expenses which have
been deducted in prior years is that it should be included as income for the year
received. Thus, reimbursement from employer to employee for traveling expenses
is to be included in the latter's income.' 0 The same is true as to reimbursement
of other expense items. For example: taxpayer purchased equipment and gave
notes in partial payment. Later taxpayer expended sums in servicing this equipment, because of defects, which he had re-sold, and took deductions therefor.
When the seller of the equipment cancelled some of the notes as reimbursement
to the taxpayer for loss of profits and expenses, the Board held that the face
amount of the notes cancelled should be taken into income in the year of adjustment." In the course of the opinion the Board said: "The use of fixed accounting periods requires that the amount by which expenses, once deducted because
paid or acccrued, are reduced by later adjustments must be taken into income in
the year of adjustment. Only in this way can the amount of the taxpayer's
reported income be made to agree with its actual income." 12
The leading case on this subject is Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,"3
where the taxpayer in the returns from 1913 to 1916 deducted expenditures
incurred from a United States dredging contract which expenses exceeded the
income. Work on this project was abandoned in 192o and the taxpayer in
a lawsuit recovered an amount equal to the excess. The Supreme Court held
that the money received in 1920 was properly included by the Commissioner as
part of the gross income for that year, again stressing the fact of the practical
necessity of computing the tax on the basis of annual or other fixed taxable
periods.' 4 Justice Stone in his opinion also points out that the fact that the
particular transaction does not result in a profit does not preclude the inclusion
of this reimbursement from income.' 5
Another interesting case dealing with this subject is Buffalo Union Furnace
Co. v. Helvering. 6 The taxpayer did its own "car spotting", certain switching
operations, from 19o5 to 1914, without payment, during which time competitors
were either receiving payment for rendering such service or having it rendered
by the railroad without charge. Because of this discrimination, as found by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the taxpayer received an amount from the
railroad in 192o. The court held that the taxpayer having deducted the expenses
8. 282 U. S. 359 (1931).

9. Asdn & Marine Co., 26 B. T. A. 409 (1932), aff'd 66 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d,
'933).
Io. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 23 (a)-2 (936). But see: J. S. Cullinan, 5 B. T. A. 996
(1927), which held that taxpayer derived no income from repayments of traveling expenses.
Note, however, that no deduction for traveling expenses had been made by the taxpayer.
II. B. F. Avery & Sons, Inc., 26 B. T. A. 1393 (1932).
12. Id. at 1400.
13. 282 U. S.359 (931).

14. Id. at 365, 366.
15. See Helvering v. Midland Mutual Ins. Co., 3oo U. S. 216, note at 226 (937): "The
exigencies of a tax determined on an annual basis may lead to the inclusion as income of
items which might be shown to involve no gain if the transactions were viewed as a whole
over several years."
16. 72 F. (2d) 399 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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in previous years, must surcharge its income for the amount reimbursed.1 7 Judge
Learned Hand differed with the Board 18 as to the treatment of so much of the
amount recovered as was properly-apportionable to the period before March I,
1913, which the Circuit Court of Appeals held, was erroneously surcharged, relying on two cases, one of which was the District Court opinion of United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. 9 After being affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, 20 this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.2 1

This indicates

that in the Buffalo Union case the whole amount might have been treated as
income in 192o when the contingent claim existing before 1913 became unconditional. However, it is to be noted that Justice Cardozo, referring to the Buffalo
Union case in his opinion in the Safety Car
case, says that it "is perhaps upon
22
the border line", and confines it to its facts.

Recent cases on this subject of reimbursement of expense items previously
deducted have followed the rule of the Sanford & Brooks Co. case.2 1 Similar to
these cases are those where an expense item properly accrued and deducted is
never paid. Thus, where employees' wages are earned and deducted from income,
but never collected and in a later year this unclaimed amount is charged to "profit
24
and loss", this is held as income for that year.

C. Reimbursement of Losses Previously Deducted
The authorities relating to reimbursement for losses are not so uniform in
their holdings as those relating to bad debts and expenses. The act provides
for deduction of losses "sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise". 5 This provision would seem to prohibit the
deduction of losses which are "compensated for by insurance or otherwise".
Ordinarily, a loss may be compensated for in one of two ways: (i) by recovery
against an insurer, or (2) by recovery against the person whose conduct has
caused the loss. Thus it would seem that if the taxpayer is compensated for in
either of these two ways, he is not entitled to take a deduction for this item.
Where the compensation is received during the same taxable year in which the
loss occurs, no difficulty arises. But suppose the loss occurs in one year and
the reimbursement is not received or finally denied until a later year. Moreover,
does it make any difference if the liability is or is not disputed.
It seems settled that mere delay in the payment of insurance proceeds, or
other reimbursement, does not furnish grounds for a different treatment of the
loss deduction. In such case the deduction must be reduced by the amount of
the reimbursement, or, in other words, the loss "is compensated for by insurance
or otherwise", although actual payment is not received in the same taxable year
in which the loss occurs.20 And the rule is also applicable to the case where the
insurer admitted liability and delay in payment of the claim was due to a dispute
as to the amount of theIossY' In this situation, the loss must be taken for the
17. Id. at 403.
8. 23 B. T. A. 439 (1931).

19. 5 F. Supp. 276 (D. C. N. J. 1934).

20. 76 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
21. 297 U. S.
22. Id. at 98.

88 (1936).

23. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 562 (1934) ; Commissioner v. John Thatcher & Son, 76 F. (2d)
900 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
24. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Burnet, 5o F. (2d) 343 (Ct App. D. C. 1931). Accord: Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th, 193'),
cert. denied 284 U. S. 618 (1931) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 23 B. T. A. 888 (193i).
25. REV. AcT 1936, §23 (e), 49 STAT. 1658, 26 U. S. C. A. §23 (e) (Supp. 1937).
26. Worstell Co., Ltd., 15 B. T. A. 413 (1929).
27. Max Kurtz, 8 B. T. A. 679 (1927).
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year in which it occurs, although the amount of28the loss is not ascertained and

adjustment is not made until a subsequent year.

In the cases to which reference has just been made, the loss was known to

the taxpayer when it occurred; there was no dispute as to liability and no doubt
that there would be reimbursement.

Usually, in these cases the lapse of time

between the loss and the reimbursement is comparatively short. However, in
other cases, which are the ones which give rise to the most difficulty, there may
be great doubt at the time the loss occurs whether reimbursement will ever be
obtained and reimbursement, if secured at all, may be years after the occurrence
of the loss. The cases fall roughly into three classes: (i) Cases involving theft
or embezzlement where the loss is not discovered until after the taxable year in
which it occurs, but upon discovery reimbursement is secured without difficulty.
(2) Cases in which the legal right to reimbursement is disputed. (3)Cases in

which there is no legal right to reimbursement at the time the loss occurs but

there is a possibility of reimbursement which is later realized.
(I) Cases involving theft or embezzlement where discovery of the loss is
delayed but reimbursement is not disputed. In these cases the right to reimbursement is not disputed and there exists a person financially willing and able
to pay, but failure to discover the loss caused considerable delay in -the taxpayer's
assertion of the right. There is very little case law on this phase of the problem.
In a Treasury Department ruling,29 a taxpayer discovered in 1916 that funds had
been embezzled over a number of years from 19o3 to 1916. The funds were
taken in such a way that they had never been included in the taxpayer's income.
Pointing .out that a loss deduction must be taken for the year in which the loss
was sustained, it was held that the amount recovered from the embezzler in 1917
should be accounted for by amending the returns in the years in which the loss
was sustained. The reasoning of this memorandum is that an embezzlement
loss is to be reduced by any right to reimbursementwhich, at the time of the loss,
isequivalent to cash, e. g., a fidelity bond covering such loss. It does not hold
that a mere possibility of recovery affects the amount of the loss deduction.3 0 It
is to be noted that this result is reached only by the use of hindsight and viewing
the transaction as a whole, and does not deal with the problem on fixed accounting periods which would seem to warrant treating the reimbursement as an item
to be included in gross income for the year 1917.
With the above memorandum is to be compared the Board's decision in
South Dakota Concrete Products Co.31 In that case funds were embezzled from
1922 to 1926 and, unknown to the taxpayer, were entered as expenses on the
books and taken as deduction from income for those years. In 1926, the embezzlement was discovered and reimbursement for the amounts secured from a third
party. The Board held the reimbursement was income for the year in which
recovered, pointing out that income tax liability is to be determined on annual
periods on the basis of facts as they existed in each period and an adjustment in
later years should be reported as income.32 The opinion continues: "In laying
down these rules the courts and the Board have been fully conscious of the fact
that losses will sometimes be deducted where the future will eventually disclose
compensation, and there will be reported as income that which is in fact only
compensation for loss. But the deductions are practical necessities due to our
28.

A. 625

Martin Veneer Co., 5 B. T. A. 27o (2926). But cf. Pike County Coal Corp., 4 B. T.

(1926).

29. L.

0. 845, i C. B. 118 (i919).

30. To the same effect, see 0. D. 165, 1 C. B. 125 (1919).
31. 26 B. T. A. 1429 (1932).
32. Id. at 1432.
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inability to read the future, and the inclusion of the recovery in income is necessary to offset the deduction." 33
This decision seems inconsistent with the opinion discussed above. In both
the taxpayer would seem to have had the benefit of a deduction and taxable
income was thus reduced by the amount of the embezzlement, and they therefore
seem to present conflicting views as to the manner in which reimbursable losses
are to be treated. The ruling takes the position that where reimbursement is
obtained after embezzlement this diminishes the amount of the allowable deduction and the return for the year of the embezzlement is to be thus amended. The
Board on the other hand held the reimbursement for embezzlement is returnable
as income in the year when received. If the possible difference is the fact of the
running of the statute of limitations in one case and not in the other, this is
neither discussed nor pointed out. From the standpoint of the government the
Board's view would seem preferable since the statute of limitations may bar any
deficiency assessment for the year of the loss.
(2) Cases in which the legal right to reimbursement is disputed. The cases
involved in this category are those in which the right to reimbursement comes,
for example, from an insurance company which denies liability, or from an
.lleged tortfeasor, financially able but unwilling to pay, denying liability. The
Board has had several cases involving these situations. Thus, where taxpayer's
property was damaged by flood in 192o and in 1924 judgment was secured against
the city which had denied liability, the Board held the taxpayer properly took
a deduction for I92O, when the loss was sustained."
The Board said that since
there was a denial of liability at the end of 1920, and since the taxpayer's only
chance of recovery lay in a lawsuit, such a state of facts does not in any manner
require the conclusion that the loss was compensated for.3 5
After this indication that losses are to be taken in the year sustained and
reimbursement received after dispute is to be treated as income for the year in
which received, the Board then reached a different result in a later case.3 6 In
this case, taxpayer's warehouse was burglarized in 1925 and the insurance company refused to pay the policy covering the loss. Taxpayer brought suit against
the insurer, and was denied recovery in 1928, for which year a deduction was
then claimed. The Board held the loss was not sustained until 1928 and was
therefore a legal deduction for that year. The only possible distinction between
these two cases by the Board is factual: in one case, claim is against an alleged
tortfeasor denying liability, whereas in the other the claim is against an insurer
denying liability. This would not seem to merit the taking of different views on
situations so nearly akin to one another. 37 It is interesting to note that in both
cases, the Board relied upon and cited United States v. White Dental Mfg. Co.38
The Board had occasion to deal with this problem again in Highway Trailer
Co.31 In this case the loss by fire occurred in 1921, not covered by insurance,
33. Ibid. Compare with this language that of Brandeis, J., in his opinion in Helvering
v. Midland Mutual Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216, note at 226 (937), quoted supra note 15.
34. H. P. Robertson Co., 14 B. T. A. 887 (1928).
35. Id. at 889. ". . . it would indeed require a high degree of optimism to say, at the
close of 1920, that the loss suffered would be compensated for, as Justice Stone said in United
States v. White Dental Manufacturing Co. of Pennsylvania, 274 U. S.398, when the provision here under consideration was being considered, 'The Taxing Act does not require the
taxpayer to be an incorrigible optimist'."
36. Allied Furriers Corp., 24 B. T. A. 457 (1931).
37. Cf. Edward H. R. Green, 19 B. T. A. 9o4 (193o) (loss sustained by shipwreck in
1919 held not deductible in 1923 when salvage therefrom disposed).
38. 274 U. S.398 (1927), to be more fully discussed under the next subsection dealing
with the situation in which no legal right to reimbursement existed at the time of the loss.
39. 28 B. T. A. 792 (1933).
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and the taxpayer had started suit against the party alleged to be responsible which
was decided against the taxpayer in 1925. The Board40sustained the deduction
for the year 1925, thus following the Allied Furriercase, and again holding that
the loss was sustained in the year in which it was decided there was no liability
on the party alleged41to be responsible. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Board and held that entire deduction should have been taken in
1921, the year when the fire occurred. In the course of the opinion, the court
stated: 42 "Where . . . an actual physical loss occurs, resulting in a certain
definite, fixed amount of damage, it seems better practice to allow the deduction
for that entire amount of damage (not covered by insurance) in the year in
which the loss actually occurs, according to the rule in the White Dental case,
rather than to defer it until subsequent events indicate whether or not a recovery
is to be had from other parties for a part of the loss." This seems consistent
intervals as advanced by Justice
with the theory of income taxation at regular
42
dissent, on the other hand, states
The
case.
Co.
Stone in the Sanford & Brooks
that the loss should not be allowed as a deduction until "realization", usually
evidenced by some dosed or completed transaction which did not occur until 1925,
when the court decided against the taxpayer."4 The Supreme Court denied
and thus acquiesced in the view taken by the majority of
certiorari in this 4case
the Circuit Court. 5
Substantially this same view was expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. John Thatcher & Son."' In that case
the taxpayer, a general building contractor, had a claim against defaulting subcontractors for damages in the amount by which cost of completing their work
exceeded the amount received by the general contractor. This claim was decided
against the contractor in 1928, for which year he then claimed a deduction. The
court held the deduction should have been taken in the years it was paid. There
were two bases for the opinion: First, the amount paid to complete the work was
an "ordinary and necessary expense" deductible when paid. Second, that it
was a loss not compensated by insurance or otherwise, since the claim against
the subcontractors was too contingent to be regarded as compensation. Judge
Learned Hand concurred only on the "loss" view, with which we are here concerned. The court states: "If the liability of the obligor [subcontractor or
surety] is too contingent to be accrued as a loss to him [because of assertion
of claim which was disputed], it would seem to follow that the claim of the obligee
is likewise too contingent to be considered compensation for a loss already realized
by the latter."

7

has also taken this
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
4
view. Thus, in Niagara Share Corp. v. Commissioner," where the taxpayer
had a contract guaranteeing against loss through the sale of securities, and sold
securities at a loss in 1930, guarantors denying liability, and the controversy not
being settled until 1934, the court held that taxpayer may deduct loss in the year
year when
when suffered and pay a tax on the amount of the loss, if any, in the
49
recovery is made. The court by their decision reversed the Board.
24 B. T. A. 457 (93), cited supra in 36.
41. Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).

40.

42.

Id. at 915.

43. See suprap. 869.
44. 72 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) at 915.

45. 293 U. S. 626 (1935).
46. 76 F. (2d) goo (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cited supra note
47. Id. at 902.
48. 82 F. (2d) 308 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
49. 31 B. T. A. 832 (1934).

23.

874

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

When the Board again was faced with this problem it 5reversed its position
to accord with the above-mentioned circuit court decisions. " But in the very
next case to reach the Board involving this same point, the Board once more
shifted its position. In Henry S. Cahn 51 the taxpayer's store was burglarized
in 1924. The insurers, Lloyds of London, denied liability and because the insurer
had no agent within the state and suit abroad would have been necessary, taxpayer's attorney advised against pursuing the claim, and the taxpayer deducted
the amount of the loss for 1924. Suit against the insurance company was settled
in 1925. The Board held, sustaining the Commissioner, that the loss deduction
should be reduced by the amount recovered. This position seems inconsistent
with that taken by the Commissioner in most52of the cases previously discussed,
However, the Board's decision
particularly in the Highway Trailer Co. case.
was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which held
that the taxpayer was entitled to a full deduction for the year of the burglary,
compromised and part of the amount of the
notwithstanding that the claim was
53
This is fully in accord, then, with the preloss recovered the following year.
vious decisions. When the loss is complete in the year in which it occurs,
regardless of whether recovery is had on a disputed claim for reimbursement,
it is deductible for that year. This is a clear indication that the reimbursement
54
for the loss is to be treated as income in the year in which it is received.
(3) Cases in which no legal right to reimbursement existed at the time of
the loss. In this class is found cases involving suits against municipalities immune
from suits or cases dealing with war losses. The leading case is United States
v. White Dental Mfg. Co.55 In this case the taxpayer owned assets in a German
corporation taken over by the German government during the war in 1918, for
which year the taxpayer deducted the amount of the loss. In 1922, recovery
of part of the sum was realized and also a claim for the remainder was allowed
by the Mixed Claims Commission. The Supreme Court held the deduction for
1918 was proper, saying: "It is enough to justify the deduction here that the
transaction causing the loss was completed when the seizure was made." 56
In these cases there is no conflict as to the year for which the loss is to be
taken. One enters the field of controversy in determining how the reimbursement should be treated when received. Much of the conflict can be traced 5to the
peculiar decision by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. 7 In
that case the taxpayer in 1921 repaid loans made for its German subsidiary
and because of the fluctuation of the mark, the amount repaid was less than the
amount borrowed. The subsidiary had lost the money borrowed and had taken
a deduction therefor. The Court held, overruling the Commissioner's contention,
that the gain resulting from the liquidation of the liability at less than the amount
borrowed was not taxable income for 1921, saying that "the result of the whole
(taxpayer required to finish work
50. Carolina Contracting Co., 32 B. T. A. 1171 (935)
for defaulting subcontractor in 1932 entitled for deduction for that year despite pending litigation against subcontractor).
51. 33 B. T. A. 783 (1935).
52. See mipra pp. 872, 873.
53. Cahn v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
54. See Commissioner v. John Thatcher & Son, 76 F. (2d) goo, 9O3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935):
"Had it [the taxpayer] succeded in recovering damages from the subcontractor or their
sureties, such recovery would have been income in the year when received."
55. 274 U. S. 398 (927).

56. Id. at 402. To the same effect see, James H. Post, 12 B. T. A. 53o (1928) (loss in
1920 through acts instigated by Government deductible in that year despite compensation received through special act of Congress in 1923).
57. 271 U. S. 170 (1926).
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transaction was a loss",58 and "the mere diminution of a loss is not gain, profit

or income". 59

Emphasis in this opinion is shifted from dealing with income taxation on
fixed accounting periods to viewing the transaction involved as a whole, regard-

less of income intervals. By the reasoning of this case, no receipt may be included
in gross income if it is derived from a transaction which, considered as a whole,
has resulted in a loss, although such loss had been deducted from gross income
in prior
years. In only one case has this broad proposition been applied success00

fully.
It should be noted that this last mentioned decision was handed down before
the Sanford & Brooks Co. decision by the Supreme Court.61 In that case the
Court said, "The excess of gross income over deductions did not any the less
constitute net income for the taxable period because respondent, in an earlier
period, suffered net losses in the conduct of its business which were in some
measure attributable to expenditures made to produce the net income of the
later period." 62 Thus, in the light of this decision it can be said that the Kerbaugh-Empire decision seems safely pigeon-holed to the special facts---discharge
of a liability by depreciated currency-without having to say that the case was
wrong to begin with. Therefore, it is not unsound to say that a receipt of money
or property may be included in gross income although received as compensation
for a loss suffered in prior years.
D. Reimbursement or Recovery of Taxes Previously Deducted
(i) Cases in which taxes were erroneously deducted. The first problem
that arises here is whether a deduction may be taken at all. If not, it would
seem that any deductions taken should be disallowed irrespective of whether
a refund is or is not secured. In the first cases to come before the Board, a refund
had been secured and the question was whether the Commissioner could disallow
the deduction, the statute of limitations not yet barring such action. In one case, 63
the taxpayer paid state inheritance tax in 1922, which was taken as a deduction
in his return for that year. In 1924, the state act was declared unconstitutional
and in 1925, the taxpayer recovered back the tax paid. The Board held the
deduction from gross income for 1922 was not a legal one and disallowance and
deficiency assessment by the Commissioner was proper. The question whether
the deduction could have been disallowed in the absence of a refund of the taxes
paid was presented in a later case.6 4 In that case the taxpayer in 1923 paid
taxes under an act declared unconstitutional in 1928. The Board held this to
be deductible for 1923, not as a tax but as a loss, since no refund had been secured
and there was little chance of this. But a subsequent Board decision 65 held taxes
paid under an unconstitutional act were properly deductible as taxes.
The first cases presented to the Circuit Courts dealing with this question
were decided in accord with the above-mentioned Board cases, to the effect that
deductions for taxes, subsequently refunded, should be disallowed where the
statute of limitations does not bar such action. Thus, in Inland Products Co. v.
Commissioner66 where the taxpayer in 1919 and 192o paid taxes under regula58. Id. at 175.
59. Ibid.
6o. Barton & Fales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. ist,
6i. 282 U. S. 359 (193),
discussed supra p. 869.
62. Id. at 364.
63. Phillip C. Brown, io B. T. A. 1122 (1928).
64. E. L. Bruce Co., ig B. T. A. 777 (930).
65. Charles F. Fawsett, 30 B. T. A. go8 (1934).
66. 31 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
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tions declared void in 1924 and received a refund of the taxes paid, the Circuit
Court for the Fourth Circuit held the income tax return could be readjusted to
eliminate the deduction. Other Circuit Courts have dealt with the problem in
the same way67
In the Inland Products case, the court expressly says it does not decide
what the result would be in a case where readjustment would be barred by the
running of the statute. 6 It is to be noted that in none of the cases decided by
the Circuit Courts up to this point had the Commissioner contended that the
refund be included in gross income for the year in which received, although this
was the contention of the taxpayer in the Inland Products case which was not
sustained. But in Houbigant, Inc. v. Commissioner6 9 the Commissioner was
forced to make this contention. In that case the taxpayer paid custom duties
under protest from 1924 to 1929.

In 1931, the duties so paid and previously

deducted were refunded. The duties had been included in the cost of the goods
sold in the taxpayer's return for the proper prior applicable years and the statute
of limitations barred adjustment in deductions and the assertion of additional
taxes for the years 1924 to 1929.

The Board, sustaining the contention of the

Commissioner, held the amount recovered by way of refund constituted income
for the year in which received. The taxpayer's contention that the running
of the Statute of Limitations could not make income of an item which otherwise
would not be income was answered by the Board in this fashion: "Having been
deducted in prior returns, if they are not taken up in gross income when recovered, the petitioner clearly over a series of years, escapes tax upon gains and
profits equaling the amount of the custom duties recovered. It cannot be presumed that such a result was contemplated by Congress. Furthermore, from any
standpoint, the petitioner was enriched by the recoveries of the import duties in
the fiscal year ended June 30, 1931. The argument that the income received from
this source is exempt from tax has no support in the law." 70 The Board's
for the Second
decision was affirmed per curiam by the Circuit Court of Appeals
72
Circuit

7

1

and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.

The problem of how a refund for taxes erroneously paid and deducted is to
be treated was more recently again presented to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. In Nash v. Commissioner,7 the taxpayer pursuant to
state income tax law paid taxes on his wife's income from 1926 to 1931, when the
tax law was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, and
in 1932, the state refunded to the taxpayer the amount paid, plus interest, the
latter item conceded to be taxable by the taxpayer. Further assessment of federal
taxes for the years 1926-1931, to correct assessments for those years, was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. The court held that a refund resulting from the
return of taxes previously paid under a mistaken view of the validity of a state
stamp of approval to this holding is again
tax is taxable. The Supreme Court's
74
marked by the denial of certiorari.
Before the Houbigant and Nash cases, the position of the Commissioner's
office was reflected by a mimeographed letter 7 which provided that if custom
duties or taxes so deducted from gross income were legally collected, refunds
67. See Leach v. Commissioner, 5o F. (2d) 372, 373 (C. C. A. ist, 1931); Bergan v.
Commissioner, 8o F. (2d) 89, 91 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
68. 31 F. (2d) 867, at 869 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
69. 31 B. T. A. 954 (1934).
70. Id. at 956.
71. 8o F. (2d) l12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
72. 298 U. S. 669 (1936).
73. 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
74. 301 U. S. 700 (1937). Accord: Victoria Mills Paper Co., 32 B. T. A. 666 (1935).
75. Mim. 3958, C. B. XI-2, 33 (1932).
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thereof should be treated as income for the year in which refunded and if such
duties or taxes were illegally collected adjustment should be made in the returns
of the taxpayers for th years in which the deductions were taken. This position
was taken and adhered to with full awareness of the fact the Statute of Limitations would bar adjustments in some cases for prior years and the taxpayers
would thus escape from taxation. The thought would seem to have been that
legislation was the proper remedy. However, after the Houbigant and Nash
cases and with those cases as authority, a new mimeographed letter by the Commissioner, superseding all previous inconsistent rulings, was issued.78 In this
ruling it is stated that in case of a refund in any year of custom duties illegally
deducted which have been taken as deductions in federal income tax returns for
a prior year, if the taxable year in which the deduction taken was closed by expiration of the period of limitation for the making of additional assessment of income
tax, or by reason of the prior execution of a final dosing or compromise agreement, or by a stipulation before the Board of Tax Appeals or the courts the refund
should be treated as income for the taxable year in which it is made. As to legally
collected taxes and duties deducted, there is no change-income when refunded.
To summarize, it can be said:
(i) Amounts erroneously paid as taxes may be deducted as taxes, expenses
or losses where no refund has been, or is likely to be, secured.
(2) Refunds of taxes erroneously paid must be accounted for by disallowing the tax deductions taken, where such disallowance is not barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
(3) When the disallowance of the tax deduction is barred, the refund is to
be treated as income for the year in which it is received.
One problem still remains. Suppose the Statute has not yet run: is the
Commissioner obliged to follow the method of disallowing deductions and adjusting income,7 7 or may he, on the other hand treat the refund as income in the year
when received, in the same way as if the Statute had run.78 Is the Commissioner
to pursue an opportunistic policy, using one method or another at his option.
This problem has as yet not been presented to the courts and it will be interesting
to note how the situation will be treated.
(2) Cases in which reimbursement for taxes paid is received from a third
person. There seems to be no conflict of opinion in this type of case. Thus,
where under sales contracts, purchaser of lots agreed to pay taxes on such lots,
security title remaining in the taxpayer, and the taxpayer collected the amount
of the taxes from the purchasers, commingled the sums with other funds and
paid the taxes on the entire property, taking a deduction therefor, it was held
that the amount collected from the lot purchasers should be included in gross
income for the year received.7 9 Such a result seems fully in accord with and
correct on the basis of the Sanford & Brooks Co. case.
Conclusion
It may be suggested that the entire problem of reimbursements may be
remedied by a proper provision in the Revenue Act making all such reimbursements income for the year received. But until this is done, the following conclusions can be made from a reading of the decisions and rulings: Any reimburse76. Mim. 4564, C. B. XVI-I, 93 (1937).
77. Inland Products Co. v. Blair, 31 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
78. Honbigant, Inc. v. Commissioner, So F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied
298 U. S. 669 (1936) ; Nash v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert.
denied 301 U. S. 700 (1937).

79. Trust No.

5522,

etc. Security-First Nat'l Bank,

27

B. T. A.

1250

(933),

rev'd on

other grounds Trust No. 5522, etc. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 8oi (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
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ment of an item properly deducted in a prior year should be included in income
for the year in which received. To determine whether an item is properly deductible or not the circumstances and the conditions as they appeared and existed
as of the time the deductions are taken should be examined. Any deduction
improperly made should be adjusted wherever such is possible, regardless of
reimbursement. If the Statute of Limitations bars adjustment, then and only
then should the reimbursement for an item improperly deducted be included in
income.
L.S.
Liabilities of Transferor and Transferee of Shares for Calls and
Assessments
A common problem confronting the courts concerns the duties of a transferor or transferee of corporate shares to respond to calls or assessments made
upon those shares. Although there has been a considerable amount of case law
upon the subject, little has been written on the general problem, as to the extent,
if any, to which each party is liable in the different situations arising in connection
with stock transfers.'
Strictly speaking, a "call" is a demand upon a shareholder for the unpaid
balance of the purchase price of his shares.2 On the other hand, an "assessment" is a demand for a contribution in excess of the par value of the stock,
based upon liability created by statute, the corporate articles or by-laws, or by
contract between the subscriber and the corporation.3 Nevertheless, there seems
to be no necessity for separate discussion of the various types of demands in the
present article since, once the validity of the call or assessment has been determined, the courts appear to apply a single method in deciding whether the
transferor or the transferee of shares is the one who must pay.
In all cases where shares are subject to call or assessment, there exists a
potential source of revenue to the corporation; consequently, the transfer of such
shares affects both the corporation and its creditors as well as the two immediate
parties to the transaction. Thus, in determining the proper person to answer a
call or assessment, the interests of the corporation and the corporate creditors
should not be overlooked.
Probably the fundamental factor in determining liability for call or assessment is that of registration of the transfer on the books of the corporation. At
common law, if the corporation did not require registration, an unrecorded
transfer was valid between the parties and against the corporation and its
creditors. 4 However, provisions in the corporate articles of association or
by-laws for registration of transfers are almost universal, and a large number
of the states have made recording mandatory by statute. 5 With the exception
I. See Notes (1932) 3o MICH. L. Rav. 1270; (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1133; (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 583. These deal with the general problem insofar as bank shareholders are
involved.
2. Campbell v. American Alkili Co., 125 Fed. 207, 209 (C. C. A. 3d, 1903); Wall v.
Basin Mining Co., i6 Idaho 313, 324, 1OI Pac. 733, 737 (igo9) ; Newman v. Sexton, 156 Ill.
App. 517, 519 (91o).
3. Seyberth v. American Commander Min. & Milling Co., 42 Idaho 254, 264, 245 Pac.
392, 395 (1926) ; Porter v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 36 N. D. I99, 207, I6I N. W.
1012, 1014 (1917) ; Price's Appeal, io6 Pa. 421, 429 (1884).
4. 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPoRATIONs (Perm. ed. 1932)

§ 5489, and cases cited therein in note 67.

5. The statutes of at least eighteen states have specific provisions for registration of
share transfers, and the majority of others assume that transfers will be recorded by making
provisions as to where such records shall be kept. The statutes are collected in the CooPATION MANUAL (39th ed. 1938), topic 20.
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of two Alabama decisions which hold that the purpose of the recording statutes
6
is to protect the creditors of the individual shareholders, the general view is
that recording is for the convenience and protection of the corporation and its
creditors.7 The effect which this interpretation of the purpose of the recording
requirements has in determining whether the transferor or transferee will be
liable for calls or assessments cannot be overemphasized.
Liability of the Transferor
(a) Prior to Recording the Transfer: Where a transfer of shares has been
made from A to B 8 in the absence of any requirements for recording, and the
corporation has assented to the transfer, it has been held that A is relieved from
9
further liability for calls in actions brought by creditors of the corporation.
shareholder
object
to
to
creditors
to
permit
reason
be
no
There would seem to
changes of a solvent corporation. There are even greater reasons for applying
the same rule to an action by the corporation, since, by hypothesis, it had
approved the transfer. It would seem, therefore, that in cases where there are
no requirements that transfers be recorded on the books of the corporation, the
transferor should be relieved from further liability to the corporation for calls
or assessments provided that the corporation is given the opportunity to refuse
to release A from liability where the financial responsibility of B is doubtful. As
to the creditors of the corporation, the same rule should apply to them, unless it
were shown that the corporation, at a time when it was insolvent, had acquiesced
in a scheme to substitute a financially irresponsible person for one able to respond
when his liability is asserted.
More common, however, is a suit against the transferor where he has failed
to comply with the requirements of recording which now exist in almost every
case. Where A has transferred to B, but no recording has been made, A, as the
shareholder of record, remains liable for calls and assessments irrespective of
whether suit is brought by the corporation,10 the creditors of the corporation,".
or the receiver.12 This rule is manifestly desirable since neither the corporation
nor its creditors have had the opportunity to determine the identity of the transferee, nor has the corporation been able to examine the transferee's financial
responsibility. Furthermore, the transferor does not thereby lose his rights
against his transferee
and can look to him for repayment of the amount which lie
13
has had to furnish.
(b) After an Ineffectual Attempt to Obtain Recording: It sometimes happens that, although no actual recording has been made, there has been an attempt
by the transferor to have the corporation make the proper registration. In such
6. Henderson v. Mayfield Woolen Mills, 153 Ala. 625, 45 So. 211 (i9o7) ; Hall & Farley
v. Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co., 173 Ala. 398, 56 So. 235 (I9,).
7. 12 FLETCrHm, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5489, n. 75 and 79.
8. Throughout this article, the transferor will be designated as A, the transferee as B.
9. Allen v. Montgomery R. R., ii Ala. 437 (1847); Dain Mfg. Co. v. Trumbull Seed
Co., 95 Mo. App. 144, 68 S. W. 95, (19o2).
io. Giesen v. London & N. W. American Mfg. Co., IO2 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 8th, igoo);
Campbell v. American Alkili Co., 125 Fed. 207 (C. C. A. 3d, i9o3); Mutual Oolitic Cut
Stone Co. v. Colgren, 91 Ind. App. 686, 173 N. E. 334 (I93O).
ii. Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Meyer, 133 Fed. 764 (M. D. Pa. 1904) ; Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. Davis, 227 Ky. 71, ii S. W. (2d) 99o (1928); Bel's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88, 8 Atl.
177 (i886) ; McCord's Appeal, 212 Pa. 177, 6i AtI. 804 (i9o5).

x2. Price v. Whitney, 28 Fed. 297 (D. Mass. i886).
13. Thus, in Broderick v. Alexander (Kahn), 268 N. Y. 306, 197 N. E. 291 (935), 13
N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 319, the transferor was permitted to interplead the transferee, and, after
judgment had been rendered against the transferor in favor of the receiver of the corporation, the former recovered judgment in a cross-claim against the transferee. Accord: Hardoon v. Belilios, [IgoI] A. C. ii8.
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a case, the corporation cannot later urge the absence of recording as a ground5
for recovery from the transferor '4 unless the notification has been insufficient.
This view seems correct inasmuch as the corporation, where it has been properly
notified of the transfer, should not later profit by its own failure to satisfy technical
requirements.
Where the suit is brought by the creditors of the corporation, court decisions,
for the most part, parallel those where the corporation is plaintiff, holding the
transferor immune to payment where he has made a bona fide attempt to have
the transfer recorded, 16 but permitting recovery by the creditor where the court
deems the attempt insufficient 17 or where the corporation refused to record the
transfer for a valid reason.' 8 Nevertheless, it is to be noted that the courts seem
more inclined to question the sufficiency of the attempt to have the transfer
recorded than in suits brought by the corporation.' 9 The records and accounts
of the corporation constitute the only available source of information to creditors
as to the identity and financial responsibility of corporate shareholders. Moreover, the shareholder, as a member of the corporation, is in closer contact with,
and has greater control over, corporate affairs. It is submitted, therefore, that
the courts should develop a different rule for creditors' suits, and permit recovery regardless of whether the failure to record resulted from the carelessness
of the transferor or the misbehavior of the corporation.
(c) After Recording the Transfer: Once the transfer has been recorded
by the corporation, and the transferee recognized as a shareholder, the transferor should be relieved of further liability for calls or assessments so long as
the transfer has been made in good faith.2 0 Furthermore, it should make no
difference whether action is brought by the corporation or the corporation's
creditors, for the recording amounts to acceptance of the substitution by the
corporation and notice thereof to its creditors. So well accepted is the view
liable, that few cases seem to have reached the
that the transferor is no longer
21
appellate courts on this point.

One notable exception to this general rule appears in the case of a transfer
to one who is not legally responsible. Thus, a recorded transfer to an infant,
even though made in good faith, and without knowledge of the transferee's
14. Bank of Toccoa v. Bond, 44 Ga. App. 450, 161 S. E. 636 (93); Ishan v. Bucking-ham, 49 N. Y. 216 (1872); Stewart v. Walla Walla Printing & Pub. Co., i Wash. 521, 2o

Pac. 6o5 (1889).

I5. Bank v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 695, 232 Pac. 1070 (1925).

I6. Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark. 374, 135 S. W.
300, 233 N. W. 529 (1930), 17 IOWA L. REv. ioo
Atl. i69 (1920) (action by receiver); Iverson
(igog); Walton Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth

896 (191I); Andrew v. Sanford,

212 Iowa
(I93) ; Schmitt v. Kulamer, 267 Pa. i, i2O
v. Bradrick, 54 Wash. 633, 2O4 Pac. 230
Lumber Co., 95 Wash. 295, 163 Pac. 762

(197).
224 Pac. io2O
(suit by Superintendent of

7. Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. Fillmore Arcade Co., 65 Cal. App. 757,
(1924)

; Broderick v. Aaron, 268 N. Y. 411, I98 N. E. 11 (1935)

Banking).

18. Russell v. Easterbrook, 71 Conn. 50, 4o AtI. 905 (898)

accept the shares).

("Transferee" refused to

I9. In many of the cases where the creditors were denied recovery although there had
been no recording, there were other records of the corporation which showed the transfer.
See for example, Iverson v. Bradrick, 54 Wash. 633, IO4 Pac. I3O (2909) (certificate book) ;
Walton Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth Lumber Co., 95 Wash. 295, 163 Pac. 762 (917) (certificates placed in minute book).
20. Subject to possible exceptions in the case of creditors existing at the time of the
transfer discussed infra.
21. The following cases set forth the general rule: Earl v. Carson, 188 U. S. 42 (29o3);
Tucker v. Gilman, 12 N. Y. 18g, :24 N. E. 302 (i89O) ; Efird v. Piedmont Land Imp. & Inv.
Co., 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. 758 (1899) ; Loomis v. Verenes, 141 S. C. 145, 139 S. E. 393
(1927).
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infancy, will not relieve the transferor of liability to either the corporation or
its creditors. 22 The effect of this rule is to place the burden of ascertaining
the responsibility of the transferee upon the person who is in the best position
to determine it, and the reasonableness of this exception does not appear to have
been questioned.
(d) FraudulentIntent of Transferor: In Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law
of Private Corporations,it is stated that "Where the transfer is merely colorable,
as, where the transferor seeks to avoid liability to creditors, the transferor
remains liable for the amount unpaid on his subscription, especially if the
transfer is made when the corporation is insolvent." 23 Although Fletcher has
correctly stated the accepted dogma,24 the difficulty before the courts lies in
determining what constitutes a colorable transfer which amounts to bad faith
on the part of the transferor. Probably the most common reason for selling
shares is that the vendor believes that he can make a more advantageous investment. Of necessity, such belief is based to a certain extent upon knowledge
of the affairs of the corporation. To hold that a transferor can not relieve himself from further liability for calls or assessments merely because the financial
condition of a corporation is dubious, would amount to virtual prohibition of
the transfer of corporate shares. Therefore, it would seem that the liability
of the transferor should be strictly limited to cases where it is shown that the
purpose of the transfer was not only to avoid personal liability, but was done
with the knowledge that .the transferee was incapable of bearing the responsibility. In Banta v. Hubbell,2 5 suit was brought against the transferor on behalf
of the corporation. In refusing recovery, the court stated: ". . . the burden
is on the plaintiff who is attacking the transfers on the ground of fraud to show
either by direct or circumstantial evidence that at the time of the transfers
both the corporation and the transferee were insolvent and the transferors had
knowledge of these facts." 2 It would seem that the Missouri court has expressed the proper view, regardless of whether suit is brought by the corporation
or on behalf of the creditors.Once it has been determined that the transfer was made with intent to
avoid liability, the courts agree that the transfer will be disregarded and the
transferor will be liable for calls and assessments.2" However, even where there
is evidence of bad faith upon the part of the transferor, it has been held that
complete acquiescence in the transfer by the corporation in making the transferee the shareholder of record, and continuous treatment of him as such, will
prevent the corporation from later changing its mind and seeking to hold the
transferor.28 This exception to the general rule should not be extended as a
bar to creditors who have had no part in the transaction, and an Alabama case
has so held,2 9 stating that the corporation's release of a solvent shareholder and
22. Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S.496 (930),
43 HAV. L. REv. 1150; Cobb v. Bank
of Martin, 46 Ga. App. IO,i66 S. E. 424 (1932), 17 MINN. L. REv. 546; Mann's Case,
L. R. 3 Ch. App. 459n. (1867) ; Symon's Case, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 298 (i87o).
23. 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 61o9.

24. See cases cited infra note 27.
25.

167 Mo. App. 38, 150 S.W. io89

(1912).

26. Id. at 45, 150 S. W. at io91. See Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. i, 21 79 N. W. 696, 703

(1899).

27. Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251 (1882) ; Utica Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Waggoner Watchman Clock Co., i66 Mich. 618, 132 N. W. 5o2 (911) ; McCaslin v. Albertson,
279 Mich. 650, 273 N. W. 302 (1937); McConey v. Belton Oil & Gas Co., 97 Minn. i9o, io6
N. W. goo (i9o6) ; see Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 58 (1886) ; Warren v. Nix, 97 Ark.
374, 388, 135 S. W. 896, 9o (ig).
28. Rochester & Kettle Falls Land Co. v. Raymond, i58 N. Y. 576, 53 N. E.507 (1899).
29. Hall & Farley v. Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co., 143 Ala. 464, 39 So. 285
(1904).
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acceptance of one who is financially irresponsible " . . . is in legal effect the

transfer of property by the corporation to the solvent subscriber without consideration, which is fraudulent and void as to the creditor. .... " 30

(e) Creditors Who May Show Fraud in the Transfer: Where it has
been shown that the transfer of shares from A to B was in fact fraudulent, and
made with the intent to enable A to escape liability for payment, the question
arises as to which creditors have been so injured by the transfer that they should
be permitted to recover. The heavy weight of authority holds that only those
persons who were creditors at the time the transfer was made are entitled to
recover."' As stated in the majority opinion in McDonald v. Dewey,32 "In
the event of . . . insolvency it is only existing creditors who can claim to

have been damnified by a fraudulent transfer of shares. As to them such
transfer is voidable. Subsequent creditors are apprised by the published list
of the names of the shareholders, to whom transfers have been made, and of the
persons to whom they may have recourse for the double liability." 3s Although
the reasoning of McDonald v. Dewey has been expressly disapproved by one
court,3 4 it would seem that the minority view would only lead to fruitless litigation by subjecting every transfer, no matter how long previously it had been
made, to scrutiny by creditors who have had ample opportunity to examine the
affairs of the corporation before electing to deal with it.
(f) Continuing Liability of Bona Fide Transferors: Where the transfer
from A to B has been in complete good faith and there has been at least substantial compliance with recording requirements, the courts are in complete
accord that A is not to be subjected to calls or assessments made for the benefit
of any persons who become creditors subsequent to the transfer.3 5 However,
there is a definite split of opinion as to whether the transferor should be
relieved of liability to those who were creditors before the transfer. Several
courts have construed their state assessment statutes so that even a bona fide
transferor remains liable to existing creditors, no matter how long subsequently
a demand is made, 38 while other courts have reached this conclusion without
statutes.3 7 This view has resulted in extreme hardship upon innocent persons.
In the recent Illinois case of Bombal v. Peoples State Bank of Ramsey, 8 the
defendant bad transferred her six shares of bank stock to her husband so that
the latter could qualify as a director of the bank. Later, the husband was able
to obtain six other shares which he had transferred to his wife to compensate
for the original six. All of the transfers were recorded. When, some time
subsequently, the bank failed, the wife was held liable to a full assessment upon
both her original six shares as well as the subsequent six, since the bank had
incurred debts during the period she first held shares. This decision clearly
shows the preferability of a contrary view expressed in two early cases, namely
30. Id. at 482, 39 So. at 291.
31. McDonald v. Dewey, 202 U. S.510 (i9o6) ; Bank of Midland v. Harris, 114 Ark. 344,
17o S. W. 67 (1914) ; Butts v. King, ioi Conn. 291, 125 Atl. 654 (1924).
32. 202 U.

33. Id. at

S.

510

(io6).

529.

34. Newton v. Bennett, 159 Ga. 426,

126

S. E.

242 (1924).

35. Walton Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth Lumber Co., 95 Wash. 295, 161 Pac. 762
(1917) ; see McDonald v. Dewey, 202 U. S.5I0, 529 (igo6).
36. Cohen v. North Ave. State Bank, io N. E. (2d) 823 (Ill. App. 1937); Gunnison v.
United States Inv. Co., 70 Minn. 292, 73 N. W. 149 (897).
37. Hawkins v. Citizens' Inv. Co., 38 Ore. 544, 64 Pac. 320 (Igoi) ; see Hall v. Hughes,

i9 Md. 487, 491, 87 Atl. 387, 389 (1912).
38. 3o N. E. (2d) 651 (Ill. 1937).
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that a bona fide recorded transfer relieves the transferor of any further obligation
to the creditors of the corporation. 9
Liability of the Transferee
(a) Before Recording of the Transfer: Where no recording of the transfer
between A and B has taken place, several courts have taken the position that
the transferee cannot be held liable for calls or assessments either where the suit
is brought in behalf of the corporation 40 or the corporate creditors. 41 However,
in Bru v. White4 2 where the receiver brought suit for statutory assessment
against the unrecorded transferee, the court stated the accepted doctrine that
4 3
the purpose of recording was for the benefit of the corporation and its creditors
who should be permitted to waive non-compliance,4 and held that the transferee, as the real owner of the stock, was liable for the assessment." Although
the view taken by the court in Bru v. White seems to be that of the minority,
it is suggested that it is the proper one. It is not inconsistent with the rule
imposing liability upon the transferor where there has been no recording, since,
as has been pointed out, the transferor, who has had to answer a call or assessment, should be indemnified by the transferee. 46 Thus, where the corporation
is, or its creditors, are able to ascertain the identity of the real owner of the
stock, a direct suit against such person seems proper not only under the reasonin the Bru case but also because it avoids litigation.
(b) After Recording of Transfer: Where there has been a bona fide transfer of shares and the transfer has been recorded, the courts are in complete
harmony that the transferee is liable for further calls or assessments regardless
of whether the suit is brought by the corporation 4T or creditors of the corporation. 48 As was pointed out in Webster v. Upton,4 9 there is an implied promise, if not a direct one, on the part of the original purchaser of shares to pay an
assessment or a balance due when called upon, and the transferee, upon coming
into privity with the corporation through the transfer, must assume that same
burden. 50
(c) Lack of Knowledge of the Transferee: An important exception to the
last rule stated exists where the transferee accepts shares without knowledge
that it is subject to assessments or that the purchase price has not been fully
39. Middletown Bank v. Magill, 5 Conn. 28 (1823); In re People's Live Stock Ins. Co.,
56 Minn. i8o, 57 N. W. 468 (1894).
40. People's Home Savings Bank v. Stadtmuller, i5o Cal. io6, 88 Pac. 28o (19o6);
Topeka Mfg. Co. v. Hale, 39 Kan. 23, 17 Pac. 6oi (1888) (suit by assignee of corporation).
41. Marks & McKey v. Brenner, 204 Ill. App. 366 (917); Broderick v. Aaron (Kornberg), 268 N. Y. 26o, 197 N. E. 274 (1935) ; Gordon v. Northern Trust Co., 121 Pa. Super.
79, 183 Atl. 352 (1936) (action by receiver).

75 F. (2d) 729,(C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
43. 75 F (2d) 729, at 730. See supra note 7.
44. Citing Johnson v. Moore, 3 Ariz. 137, 250 Pac. 995 (1926) (unrecorded shareholder
who had paid assessment permitted to recover dividends not paid to him).
45. Accord: Ohio Valley Nat. Bank v. Hulitt, 204 U. S. 162 (z9o7) (pledged stock);
Wright v. Keene, 82 Mont. 6o3, 268 Pac. 545 (1928).
46. Supra note 13.
47. Hartford & N. H. R. R. v. Boorman, 12 Conn. 530 (1838); Visalia & Tulane R. R.
v. Hyde, ixo Cal. 632, 43 Pac. io (1895) ; Bend v. Susquehanna Bridge & Bank Co., 6 Har42.

ris & J. 128 (Md. 1823).

48. Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65 (1875) (suit by assignee in bankruptcy) ; Pullman
v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328 (1877) (suit by assignee in bankruptcy) ; Crawford v. Swicord, 147
Ga. 548, 98 S. E. 1025 (I918) ; Coleman v. Howe, 154 Ill. 458, 39 N. E. 725 (I895) ; Edwards
v. Schillinger, 245 Ill. 231, 91 N. E. io48 (igio) ; Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown, 171 N. Y. 488,
64 N. E. 194 (x90) ; Mountain Lake Land Co. v. Blair, io9 Va. 147, 63 S. E. 751 (i9o9).
49. 9I U. S. 65 (1875).
50. 9i U. S. at 69.
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paid. In the leading case of Bryant v. Ehlen,1' where there was no indication on
the certificates that the shares were not fully paid, the court points out that
since the transferee had no notice of the unpaid purchase price, there dearly
could be no implied promise to answer to calls. Bryant v. Ehlen is supported
by the weight of authority no matter whether suit is brought by the corporation 52 or creditors of the corporation.53 This view is further supported by
Section 15 of the UINIFORm STOCK TRANSFER ACT which prohibits any liens
or restrictions upon shares unless such restrictions are printed on the certificate.5 4 The avowed purpose of this provision is to make share certificates as
much like negotiable instruments as is reasonably possible.5 5 Nevertheless, one
state, California, has consistently held that a transferee takes shares subject to
all liabilities which the transferor had, regardless to the former's knowledge.58
No cases have been found outside of California which support its view, and
although the California rule tends to protect innocent creditors of the corporation, it has the greater disadvantage of hindering the transfer of shares.
(d) Liability of Transferee for Debts Incurred Prior to His Shareholdership: Occasionally, subsequent to the acquisition of the status of a shareholder,
the transferee maintains that he should not be held liable for assessments or
calls that are made to satisfy corporate debts which were incurred prior to his
having become a shareholder. Little sympathy has been shown by the courts
for this contention with the result that only one case has been found which
protected a transferee in a suit for the unpaid purchase price of shares held by
him, 57 while the heavy weight of authority is to the effect that one who is a
shareholder at the time of suit is liable regardless of when the debts accrued.58
Having voluntarily joined the corporate enterprise, by acquiring shares with
knowledge that they were subject to assessments or to calls for the balance of
the purchase price, a shareholder should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits
incidental to shareholdership without assuming liability for the coexistent
burdens.
Summary
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the respective liabilities
of transferors and transferees of shares for calls and assessments have become
rather clearly defined. Once there has been a recording of the transfer, the
transferee is always liable while the transferor's responsibility is, in most instances, ended. In situations where no recording has taken place, neither the
51.

59 Md. I (1882).

52. West Nashville Planing Mill Co. v. Nashville Say. Bank, 86 Tenn. 252, 6 S. W. 340
(1888) (transferee was a pledgee).
53. French v. Harding, 235 Pa. 79, 83 Atl. 586 (1912) ; Blain v. Patterson, 62 S. D. 4o7,
253 N. W. 478 (1934).
54. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (1922) 20.

The act has been adopted in 24 states and Alaska.
See 6 UNIFoRM LAws ANN. (Supp. 1936) 5.
55. See commissioner's note to § 15 of the UNIFORM STocK TRANSFER AcT, 6 UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. (1922) 20; United States Gypsum Co. v. Houston, 239 Mich. 249, 252,- 214 N.
W. 197, 199 (1927).

56. Perkins v. Cowles, 157 Cal. 625, io8 Pac. 711 (191o); Geary St. P. & 0. Ry. v.
Bradbury Estate Co., 179 Cal. 46, I75 Pac. 457 (i9i8). Although California has adopted
the UNIFORM STocI TRANSFER AcT, it has altered section 15 by making the information upon
a share certificate that it is not fully paid permissive and within the discretion of the corporation, instead of mandatory: CAL. CiT. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 330.15. This can probably be
explained by the fact that, until recently, California did not recognize the general view that a
shareholder's liability can be limited.
57. Chesley v. Pierce & Sawyer, 32 N. H. 388 (1885).
58. Visalia & Tulane R. R. v. Hyde, IiO Cal. 632, 43 Pac. IO (1895) ; Root v. Sinnock,
120 Ill. 350, II N. E. 339 (1887); Curtis v. Harlow, 53 Mass. 3 (1846); Cleveland v. Burnham, 55 Wis. 598, 13 N. W. 667 (1882).
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transferor nor the transferee is entirely safe from litigation. Nevertheless,
there seems to have been little analysis on the part of the courts as to why
recording should be all-important. In many cases, as, for example, a suit against
an unrecorded transferee, there would seem to be no equitable reason to consider
recording in determining the proper person to be liable. On the other hand,
it cannot be denied that recording does serve as a concrete notification to all
parties concerned of the change in shareholder membership. At all events, the
importance of recording share transfers cannot be overemphasized inasmuch
as it has been made the governing factor, the presence or absence of which most
likely will determine upon whom shall fall the burden of answering subsequent
calls or assessments.

W. W. Jr.

Election Disputes Within Trade Unions
Types and Significance of Disputes
Labor's more spectacular battles may be those waged against employers, or,
as of late, inter-union strife, but the pages of federal and state reports frequently
contain accounts of litigation growing out of internal dissension within the union.
The sharpness of the dispute is often surpassed in interest only by the vital
import that this domestic combat contains for the individual laborer. His right
to work may well be the issue. The facts that give rise to intra-union troubles
follow no stereotype pattern. Variety is the rule rather than the exception.
The disputes themselves may more easily be classified. They embrace disciplinary questions of fine, suspension, expulsion,' problems of admission to membership,2 or of seniority rights,3 or allegations of improper use of union funds.4
Another large and important group relates to voting controversies. It is primarily with this group that this discussion deals. The issues here are neither of
equal interest nor of equal significance, to union leaders, union members, or to
the public. It may be that the only point that is involved is whether a procedural
technicality was observed in the conducting of an election of an officer. Perhaps
there is a dispute between A and B in which each contends that he has been
chosen to fill an office of the union,5 with nothing more at stake than the private
ambition of each. But the same set of facts may provide the battleground on
which there is to be determined a fundamental principle of control. Thus if A
is the chosen leader of a local group which is asserting its right to autonomy,
and B is the representative of another group from the union hierarchy of councils,
that which is really in issue is whether the democratic process of government
shall prevail within the union.6 It may be that the conflict occurs not over the
I. For a discussion of disciplinary problems, see Steever, The Control of Labor Through

Union Discipline (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 212; Notes (1930) 30 CoL. L. REV. 847, (1917) 1
MINN. L. REV. 513, (1936) 20 MINN. L. REV. 657, (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 291, (1935)
44 YALE L. J. 1446, (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248.
2. See Note (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 657, 661; WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCOPORATED
AssOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRuSTS (2d ed. 1923) 297.
3. All the cases are reviewed in Christenson, Seniority Rights Under Labor Union
(1937) 11 TEMP. L. Q. 355.
4. See Note (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 657, 665.
5. Farrell v. Cook, 58 Hun 6o3, ii N. Y. Supp. 326 (Sup. Ct. 189o).
6. Malloy v. Carroll, 272 Mass. 524, 172 N. E. 790 (193o) ; Webster v. Rankins, So S.
W. (2d) 746 (Mo. App. 1932); Local No. 373 v. International Ass'n, 12o N. J. Eq. 220, 184
Atl. 531 (1936).

Working Agreements
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result of any given vote, but over the right to participate in an election. 7 Then
the problem to be decided is whether an individual or a group may be disfranchised. A similar consideration is present when an individual or a group seeks
either to force an election to be held that has been denied,8 or makes an effort
to prevent the holding of an election which may adversely affect some interest. 9
Methods by which such disputes are presented to be adjudicated also differ.
The court may be asked to decide directly the disputed point.'0 But if A brings
an action to secure possession of property in the hands of B, 11 the ultimate right
of possession depending on the validity or invalidity of an election, or if A has
been expelled and seeks reinstatement, alleging that the board which ousted
him was not duly chosen, 12 the issue is raised collaterally. It may be inquired
of what concern it is to the courts in any event that disputes arise concerning
elections, and why they should exercise jurisdiction at all. One answer is that
the leadership within unions has been known in some instances to be less interested in the members than in its own welfare. In consequence there may well
appear in those cases administration that is unenlightened and designed to
further personal gain and ambition. Discrimination and a degree of corruption
then become inevitable concomitants.3 Where such leadership exists, disciplinary weapons of fine, suspension, or expulsion become a potent means of controlling opposition. Moreover there has occasionally appeared a tendency, where
such leadership exists, to prevent free expression of opinion and opposition.
Penalties have been imposed where the offense was seemingly nothing more than
free thought.'4 This is probably explained by the history of trade unionism,
7. Cameron v. International Alliance, i18 N. J. Eq. II, 176 Atl. 69z (1935), aff'd in i1g
N. J. Eq. 577, 183 AtI. 157 (1936), 45 Yale L. J. I494; Collins v. International Alliance, iig
N. J. Eq. 230, 182 Atl. 37 (Ch. z935) ; Bertucci v. United Cement Masons' Union, 139 Misc.
703, 249 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
8. Walsche v. Sherlock, iio N. J. Eq. 223, 159 Atl. 66i (Ch. 1932); Harris v. Geier,
112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 50 (Ch. 1932); Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855,
257 N. Y. Supp.

597 (Sup. Ct.

1932).

9. McNichols v. International Typographical Union, 21 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927).
io. Carey v. International Brotherhood, 123 Misc. 680, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct.
1924) ; Bennett v. Kearns, 88 Atl. 8o6 (R. I. 1913) ; Amalgamated Society
v. Jones, 2!9 T.
L. R. 484 (K. B. 1913).
ii. Chamberlain v. Lincoln, 129 Mass. 70 (i88o) (lodge) ; Farrell v. Cook, 58 Hun. 603,
ii N. Y. Supp. 326 (Sup. Ct. I89O).
12. Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Maclean
v. The
Workers' Union, [1929] I Ch. 602; cf. Roberts v. Kennedy, I5 Del. Ch. 24, 14o Atl. 654
(Ch. 1925) (where A as union president sued B for breach of trust. B's defense was that A
was not president.).
13. In Collins v. International Alliance, I9 N. J. Eq. 230, 238, 182 Atl. 37, 42 (Ch.
1935), it appeared that union members were forced to perform officers' jobs. Officers extorted
money through control of jobs. There was also financial mismanagement. So also in Chalghian v. International Brotherhood, 114 N. J. Eq. 497, I69 Atl. 327 (Ch. 1933), there was
gross financial mismanagement. See Mintz, Trade Union Abuses (932)
6 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 272; Note (1936) 20 MINx. L. REv. 657; N. Y. Times, Dec. 21,
1937, p. io, col. i,
where four labor leaders were indicted for extorting money from builders, and the indictment
spoke of ". . . the evil and damage done by these unprincipled racketeers whose dictatorship is robbing union labor of its right to work. . ....
14. Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (preferring
charges against leaders) ; Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921)
(beneficial association) (petitioning a legislature) ; Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 6o4, I65
N. E. 68 (1929) (testifying under oath to an opinion contrary to a position advocated by the
union) ; Burke v. Monumental Div., 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md. i919), Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W.
435 (Mo. App. 1927) (instituting an action against union or officers) ; Riverside Lodge v.
Amalgamated Ass'n, 13 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa. 1935) (holding an unauthorized meeting);
Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (taking a vote of
members without authority to do so) ; Heasley v. Operative Plasterers, 324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl.
206 (1936) (refusing to retract a letter criticizing the attitude of officers in regard
to a
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evolving from the period when laborers' collective activity was illegal as a conthe cause was
spiracy and a restraint of trade, and unquestioning devotion to
8
Where these
indispensable.1 5 That the reason no longer exists is apparent.'
factors of unfortunate choice of leaders and suppression of honest opposition
appear, the need for occasional exercise of jurisdiction by courts becomes discoverable. Whatever effective control the members are to retain over the officers
can come only through the channel of free choice of leaders and uncontrolled and
unhampered exercise of voting rights. Unless there is an adequate power that
will accept jurisdiction in election controversies and resolve them in accordance
with judicially determined standards, there may be little prospect that union
members who are subjected to undesirable leadership will be able to interfere
with the controlling group, or displace it. If leadership control of elections cannot be effectively contested, and if there is but a limited review of this type of
dispute in the courts, it follows that in those cases where the leadership seeks
improper power or gain, the economic existence of the members is largely out of
their own hands.
Limitations Upon Jurisdiction
When a member of a union seeks the aid of a court in an issue that involves
an election dispute, he is met at the outset by several common law principles that
may be a barrier to the litigation. These doctrines existed before labor unions
were recognized as lawful. They were customarily invoked when internal problems in voluntary non-profit associations found their way into court.' 7 One of
the principles is to the effect that the constitution and by-laws of the union constitute a contract among the members. It follows that the plaintiff's path is a
difficult one if he is unable to allege a breach of contract, in that the rules of the
union were not complied with. If there has been no breach, courts are reluctant
to exercise jurisdiction. The contract theory may be found in innumerable cases
of labor union dissension that have been passed upon by the courts.' 8 An English
court has stated that "A person . . . has . . . no legal right of redress if he be
expelled according to the rules, however unfair and unjust the rules or the action
of the expelling tribunal may be .

. ." '9

Not all the American decisions have

been either so utterly unrealistic or so devoid of hope for the union member. Nor
has the contract theory gone without criticism. It has been subjected to penetrating attack.20 But in general the attention of the court will be directed to the
inquiry whether the rules have been observed.
strike) ; Love v. Grand International Div., 139 Ark. 375, 2,5 S. W. 6o2 (igig) (issuing a
circular in relation to the business of the brotherhood) ; Neal v. Hutcheson, i6o N. Y. Supp.
ioo7 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (refusing to accept a strike settlement).
17, 18. See FRANKFURTER AND
15. GROAT, ORGANiZED LABOR IN A IERICA (1926)
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 2 et seq., for an account of the early application of
the doctrines of conspiracy and restraint of trade to the labor union.
I6. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. III (Mass. 1842), rejected the idea of criminal conspiracy. Validity of union: Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917);
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (igo6).
17. Low v. Harris, 9o F. (2d) 783, 785 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Carey v. International
Brotherhood, 123 Misc. 68o, 687, 206 N. Y. Supp. 73, 83 (1924) ; Williams v. District Executive Bd., I Pa. D. & C. 31, 34 (1921).
18. Walsche v. Sherlock, Iio N. J.Eq. 223, 227, 159 Atl. 661, 663 (Ch. 1932) ; Carey v.
International Brotherhood, 123 Misc. 68o, 687, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 73, 83 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; Cox
v. United Brotherhood, 69 P. (2d) 148, 15o (Wash. 1937).
19. Maclean v. The Workers' Union, [1929] I Ch. 602, 624. But in Burn v. National
Amalgamated Labourer's Union, [1920] 2 Ch. 364, 374, it was stated that even if the rules
authorized removal of an officer without a hearing, such rule would be invalid as opposed to

natural justice.

20. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43 HARv. L.
RE-v. 993, 1001-1007. This is one of the best discussions that has appeared on the nature of
the voluntary association.
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Another rule usually stated to be applicable in cases arising from within
voluntary associations is that where the association itself contains adequate
appellate machinery, the courts will not interfere until internal remedies have
been exhausted.2 1 This is, then, a second problem that confronts the union
member when he asks the court to act in reference to an election controversy.
The principle is in reality only a phase of the concept that the rules of the union
constitute a contract among the members. It is usually referred to in judicial
opinion, however, as a separate basis for a consideration of whether or not to
exercise jurisdiction. The appellate machinery within the association is invariably provided for by the constitution or by-laws. It may include a long drawn
out method of appeal through a series of tribunals requiring long intervals of
delay. Final appeal is apparently taken in the usual situation to the convention
that meets annually or less frequently.
Apart from the question of the contract that is said to exist in the union
rules, and the requirement that remedies within the union shall have been exhausted, the ubiquitous "property right" so long searched for in courts of equity
is treated as a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction ih this type of
dispute.2 2 Like the contract theory, the property right theory has been criticized
as the basis for intervention in union disputes.2 3 It is suggested that the real
basis for protection of rights is the relationship that arises from membership.2 4
But the cases abound with statements regarding property rights. That has long
been true where litigation results from a controversy within any type of voluntary
association. But it is not, of course, an exclusive characteristic of actions involving internal problems in associations, but rather the same idea that has permeated
equity jurisdiction in general.
The wisdom of such judicial formulae in these cases is open to question.
When a court is asked to pass upon the merits of a union controversy, one may
ask whether there is any justification for quoting the same rule of law and
citing the same group of authorities to be relied upon in a controversy within a
fraternity, or a lodge, or a social club, merely because all are regarded as voluntary associations not for profit. The distinction is articulate in but few cases.2 5
Policies Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction
Consideration of the principles that are generally thought to govern the
exercise of jurisdiction, in their application by the courts, will be made in inverse
21. Hickey v. Baine, 195 Mass. 446, 81 N. E. 201 (907) ; Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375,
213 N. W. 366 (1927)
(seniority dispute) ; Bertucci v. United Cement Masons' Union, 139
Misc. 703, 249 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Fraser v. Buck, 234 S. W. 679 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1921) (benevolent society); OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS
(1927) 94.
22. Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923); Reichert v. United
Brotherhood, 14 N. J. Misc. io6, 183 Atl. 728 (Ch. 1936) ; Heasley v. Operative Plasterers,
324 Pa. 257, 188 Atl. 2o6 (936); see Franklin v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines,

N. J. Eq. 205, 193 Atl. 712, 718 (Ch. 1937) ; OAKES, op. cit. supra note 21, at 35.
23. Chafee, supra note 20, at 999-1OOl.
24. Id. at lOO7; see also case note on Cameron v. International Alliance, i19 N. J. Eq.
577, 183 Atl. 157 (1936), 45 YALE L. J. 1494.
25. ". . . autonomous possession and exercise of rights and powers during a period of
25 years . . . by a particular class of the membership, can hardly be characterized as a
purely internal affair of a voluntary association." Howard v. Weissmann, 31 F. (2d) 689,
122

694 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).

"Something more than mere membership in a voluntary associa-

tion is embraced in this case. .

.

. Their right to labor is property. .

.

. The right to

make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty." Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 435, 139 N. E. 629, 631 (1923).

"The exact and prompt solution of such

disputes [in mutual benefit society] are of small importance either to the state or to the litigants compared to the major controversies that sometimes develop within trade unions. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, io6, 164 At. 50, 53 (Ch. 1932).
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order. Plaintiff is called upon to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court
that he has a property right at stake about which he wishes the court to take
some action. A study of the cases involving labor unions suggests that a property
right is often found. In fact, it appears that in few cases of union disputes has
the court rejected consideration of the merits of the case on the ground that no
property right was involved. At least insofar as the question of finding a property
right is involved, it does not appear to matter whether the particular issue sought
to be litigated is an election dispute, or a disciplinary problem, or any of the other
forms of litigation that may arise from the union's internal conduct. If the plaintiff's claim is meritorious, the court can and does find, and perfectly legitimately,
a property right. Thus property rights have been found-to exist in benefits paid
by the union,26 in the right to work,27 in the right to vote, 28 in the selection of
a representative.2 9 If the union member has any real grievance, the court is
unlikely to reject a review of the case in the absence of a traditional property
right. If the courts continue to require the presence of a property right before
reviewing the substance of an election dispute, there is no good reason why a
property right should not always be found. Since union membership often
controls the ability to follow a given occupation, and since there are usually
certain benefits attached to membership, such as strike or unemployment or death
benefits, the right to a free and unhampered voice in internal government can
itself be labelled a property right. Standing alone and with no other circumstances in the picture, it may not bear a very close resemblance to the traditional
concept of a property right. But if it is considered in conjunction with the
surrounding facts, it is in reality the right to share in control of the union organization which may well be the most important single factor in the economic destiny
of the individual member.
The generally stated rule that a union member who seeks the aid of the
court must first exhaust his remedies as provided within the association itself, if
applied literally, would constitute a very serious problem to a member who has
in fact been unfairly treated. If, for instance, a local union were wholly deprived
of the right to self-organization, and elections forbidden, by the parent organization, which put in its own officers to dominate all activities of the local, whether
or not in violation of the union constitution; and if, as in one instance, the national
convention were held only once in four years, 0 nearly four years might elapse before appeal could be taken to the convention. But as might be expected, the rule is
not applied literally, and as in the principle requiring a property right, there
appears to be in effect considerable departure from the common law doctrines
applicable to voluntary associations. This is true whether the litigation involves
an election dispute or some other type of problem. So many exceptions have been
engrafted upon the rule that it appears to apply in only a minority of cases. In
a majority of cases of election disputes surveyed, the necessity of exhaustion of
internal remedy was dispensed with. The reasons given are that it is not necessary to appeal to a union tribunal if there would be great delay, 3' or if the action
26. Howard v. Weissmann, 31 F. (2d) 689, 693 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
27. Walsche v. Sherlock, io N. J. Eq. 223, 249, 159 At. 661, 672 (Ch. 1932).
28. Osborne v. Amalgamated Society, [igii] i Ch. 540, 567.

29. Myers v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 7 F. Supp. 92, 97 (W. D. La. 1933).
This was an
action by the union to restrain the railroad company from interfering in the selection of
officers. System Federation No. 4o v. Virginian Ry., Ii F. Supp. 621 (E. D. Va. 1935),
aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), af'd, 300 U. S. 5,5 (1937), was also an action to
restrain outside interference in a union election. Here too, at 633, the court found a property
right in the right of self-organization and representation.
3o. Reichert v. United Brotherhood, 14 N. J. Misc. io6, 183 Atl. 728 (Ch. 1936).
31. Ibid., the disputed question being one of merger; Bailey Montgomery, 177 App. Div.

777, 165 N. Y. Supp. 159 (ist Dep't, 1917) (lodge).
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appealed from is contrary to public policy and void,

2

or if property rights are

involved, 38 or if the action appealed from was in excess of authority,
85

88

4

or if

These
damages are sought, or if an appeal would plainly be futile and vain.
phrases are elastic. They suggest that in any case where to appeal to the union
tribunal would be unduly inconvenient, or cause needless hardship, an exception
will be found. No loss would be felt if the rule were dispensed with entirely,
and the fact of whether or not the complainant had exhausted all possible remedies were regarded as but one factor in the court's determination of whether it
would exercise jurisdiction. Such appears to be the rule in effect in the decisions
cited above, though not articulate.
In the application of the principle that the rules of the union constitute a
contract among the members, the typical attitude of the courts is to inquire what
are the rules as provided by constitution and by-laws, and whether they have been
observed. Compliance will be required if they have not.37 In the law relating to
voluntary associations not for profit, one rule is that the majority governs in any
vote that may be regularly taken.38 The rule is equally applicable within trade
unions. One type of situation has arisen in two recent cases that presents another
rule. A majority of the members of the union, purporting to act for the entire
local, voted to dissolve the old union and to set up a new one. In one case the
action sought to effect a transfer of funds from the old local to the new group."5
In the other, there was a bill to restrain the officers of the old local from continuing to act as representatives of the union. 0 The result was the same in each
instance. The majority was held to have seceded and to be unable to control
the union property, which remained in control of the remaining minority. Thus
there is this limitation on a rule of majority control.
But illustrative of the typical response to election disputes is a case in which,
in an election of national officers, votes of certain locals were rejected because
Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 Ati. 692 (935).
33. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Ati. 5o (Ch. 1932); Lo Bianco v. Cushing,
117 N. J. Eq. 593, 177 At1. 1O2 (Ch. 1935) (expulsion).
34. Local No. 7 v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Tex. 1922) ; Webster v. Rankins, 50 S.
W. (2d) 746 (Mo. App. 1932) ; Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup.
Ct. 1932). Contra: Bertucci v. United Cement Masons' Union, 139 Misc. 703, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 193).
35. Grand International Brotherhood v. Green, 21o Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923) (expul32.

sion).
36. Walsche v. Sherlock, Iio N. J. Eq.

223, 159 At. 661 (Ch. 1932) ; Local No. ii v.
McKee, 114 N. J. Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (Ch. 1933) ; Neal v. Hutcheson, 16o N. Y. Supp.
1oo7 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
37. Dahl v. Palache, 68 Cal. 248, 9 Pac. 94 (1885) (church, notice not given) ; Harris
v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 5o (Ch. 1932) (prevention of meetings and election) ;
Goller v. Strubenhaus, 77 Misc. 29, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (benevolent society, notice not given) ; Bailey v. Montgomery, 177 Ap. Div. 777, 165 N. Y. Supp. 59 (Ist
Dep't, 1917) (lodge, meeting at wrong place); Williams v. District Executive Bd., i Pa. D.
& C.31 (1921) (nomination dispute).
38. Goesele v. Bimeler, 14 How. 589 (U. S. 1852) (society) ; Tucker v. Paulk, 148 Ga.
(church) ; Stryjewski v, Panfil, 269 Pa. 568, 112 Atl. 764 (1921)
228, 96 S. E. 339 (918)
(church). System Federation No. 4o v. Virginian Ry., II F. Supp. 621 (E. D. Va. 1935).
aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), affd, 300 U. S. 515 (8937), and Association of
Clerical Employees v. Brotherhood, 85 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) were cases interpreting the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), amended by 48 STAT. I185 (1934), 45
U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1937). In both cases it was held that the majority of a craft meant
only that a majority must vote, and that a majority of those voting could determine in a
choice between a company union and the A. F. of L.
39. Low v. Harris, 9o F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
In Flaherty v. Portland
40. Martin v. Smith, 286 Mass. 227, 19o N. E. 113 (1934).
Longshoreman's Benevolent Society, 99 Me. 253, 59 Atl. 58 (19o4), a minority of the union
prevented the majority from acting on a resolution authorizing expenses beyond the by-laws,
though the by-laws could have been altered by majority vote.
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the rules had not been complied with. The result was to elect B instead of A.
The errors were that the votes had not all been taken in one day, or that they
were taken before the appointed day, or that there were not enough supervisors,
and in one case that a charter fee had not been paid. The lapses were due to
the neglect of local officials. The court held that where the rules of the union
41
covered the situation it would not interfere, unless public policy were involved.
Here it did not think such an element was present. The potentialities of such a
rule within the union are apparent. Officers, through the simple device of slight
technical errors, are enabled to disfranchise the entire membership of a given
local.
Courts will ordinarily interfere in the internal management of the union
either to prevent or to undo conduct by the organization that is either contrary
to the rules or else not specifically permitted thereunder, viewing them as parts
of a contract that should be adhered to. Frequent cases illustrate this point.
Thus, where a rule was passed that anyone "who worked against the interest of
local 570" should lose, for ten years, the right to a voice or vote or to hold office,
the court prevented enforcement of the rule on the ground that there was no
authority that permitted the union to pass such a rule.42 In another case where
the county tribunal took over the management of the local union, and refused
to allow an election to be held, the court granted a decree to restore the autonomy
43
of the local, on the ground that there was no authority for such action.
There has been a group of cases involving the same general issue, where the
complainant or complainants sought the right to participate freely in an election,
or the right to have an election held where it had been denied. 44 A
slight variation of the facts occurred in another instance where national
officers refused to allow a local union to hold any elections. The local proceeded nevertheless to hold an election, whereupon the national officers endeavored to cause local members to lose their employment. An injunction was
granted restraining the prevention of the election, as well as the other unauthorized conduct. 45 The conclusions that may be drawn from cases of this type are
that the courts will exercise jurisdiction to compel compliance with the union
rules where they have been disregarded; and, in another phase of the same principle, that where there is conduct which may not violate any given rule but which
is not specifically authorized, the conduct may be restrained or undone, if it is
in plain disregard of some substantial right.
There is another category of cases in which the plaintiff's grievance does
not rest upon a violation of constitution or by-laws of the union, or upon an
alleged action that is not specifically authorized, but rather upon the contention
that conduct that is apparently permitted by the union rules is nevertheless
so unfair that the rules should be disregarded. There are not many cases involving an election dispute where such question has arisen, though there are many
where the contention might well have been made to the court. It might be
pointed out that such argument has frequently been sustained by courts with
reference to other types of litigation that have arisen from union difficulties. Thus
41. Carey v. International Brotherhood, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct.
1924).
42. Bertucci v. United Cement Masons' Union, 139 Misc. 703, 249 N. Y. Supp. 635 (Sup.
Ct. 1931).
43. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J.Eq. 99, 164 Atl. 5o (Ch. 1932).
44. Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Local No.
ii v. McKee, 114 N. J.Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (Ch. 1933); Local No. 373 v. International
Association, 12o N. 3. Eq. 22o, 184 At. 531 (1936).
45. Webster v. Rankdns, 5o S. W. (2d) 746 (Mo. App. 1932).
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courts have held the rules requiring a member to have a permit to work,46 or
depriving a member of the right to testify under oath, 47 or denying the right of
free speech, 48 or forbidding petition to the legislature, 49 or requiring relinquishment of constitutional rights as a condition of membership, will be set aside.
The theory of such decisions is that the rule is so oppressive and unjust that
the contract is against public policy. However, there are several cases where a
similar result was reached in which the issue was either solely or at least partly
concerned with an election controversy. In one interesting case, the international
union, acting in accordance with its constitution, amended the constitution to
eliminate an allied district union and make the locals comprising the district
directly subordinate to the international. The effect was to destroy a 25-year
autonomy of the local unions. The court enjoined the carrying out of the
amendment, declaring that such autonomy "by a particular class of the membership can hardly be characterized as a purely internal affair of a voluntary
association." 51 The result is simply that the court set aside the constitution of
the union in order to protect the voting rights of a group. In other litigation
involving the same parties, substantially the same result was reached under a
different name. There the constitution directed the executive committee to submit amendments to the local unions on petition of 15O locals. There was a proper
petition for an amendment aimed at depriving the plaintiff local of voting strength
in the national organization. The executive committee declined to act, whereupon
the president prepared to submit the amendment. The court held that he could
not do this, that the committee as a whole had to act. 52 Since it was plainly
competent for the court to declare that the submission of the amendment was
obligatory upon the committee, and hence that if the committee refused to act
the president might act alone, the decision seems an evident matter of construing
the union constitution to protect the voting rights of a minority. It is true that
the court did not here hold that the constitution itself was unenforceable, but it so
strictly constrtied the provision in question that it amounted to almost the same
thing.
In two other cases the action was brought against a common defendant by
separate plaintiffs. In both there were a series of particularly undesirable practices by union leaders. In the first case, the plaintiffs were by the rules of the
union deprived of any voice whatsoever in union affairs. They petitioned to
have the constitution and the by-laws annulled. The court set aside the entire
arrangement, and accorted the plaintiffs a complete voice in determination of
union affairs.53 In the second case, no annual elections had taken place for io
years, and certain officers remained in control through repressive practices. Here
also the court restored to the plaintiffs the right to self-government and free
elections of their own representatives.54
46. Walsche v. Sherlock, iio N. J. Eq. 223,

i59 Atl. 66, (Ch. 1932).
47. Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 6o4, 165 N. E. 68 (1929).
48. Eschman v. Huebner, 226 Ill. App. 537 (1922) ; Jose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205
N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
49. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (921).
5o. Cameron v. International Alliance, i8 N. J. Eq. II, 23, 176 Atl. 692, 698 (0935)

(holding that a union member may not be deprived of the "free use of his hands", and that

. . . freedom".
5I. Hovard v. Weissmann, 31 F. (2d) 689, 694 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).
52. McNichols v. International Typographical Union, 21 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 7th,

one may not "barter away

1927).

53. Cameron v. International Alliance, ix8 N. J. Eq. ii, 176 Atl.

692 (Ch. 1935).
54. Collins v. International Alliance, II9 N. J. Eq. 230, 182 Ati. 37 (Ch. 1935).
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In another related case, a local union was entirely deprived of the right
to hold elections, but was controlled by appointed officers. The court restrained
the appointees from acting as officers, and decreed that the local hold its own
election. It is true that the basis of the decision was that the constitution of the
union had been violated. But the language plainly implied that if the rules had
purported to permit this type of conduct, relief would nevertheless have been
granted. It stated that "The constitution and laws of every labor organization are
to be judged and construed in this State and country according to well-conceived
ideals and principles of law ordained by a democratic people proud of their
heritage and jealous of the protection of their rights of equal opportunity, of
voice in the selection of local and general officials .... 2P55
There is, therefore, in addition to the list of cases where the courts have disregarded the rules of the union in other controversies, a not inconspicuous group
where constitution or by-laws have been similarly disregarded in election disputes.
Here the question has been not what the rules were, but whether the rules were
not oppressive. In these cases, although the defendants endeavored to block
action with all of the traditional objections to exercise of jurisdiction by the court,
the courts found the contract theory no obstacle whatsoever. A property right
was easily discoverable. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedy within the union
vanished before the urgent necessity of the facts.
Conclusion
That only a small minority of the cases of misuse of power ever come before
the courts is the strong probability. The processes of litigation are costly and
slow; fear of reprisals may exist. Added to this is what has been described as a
distrust for legal processes on the part of workers.58 Ordinarily the problem of
interference in union affairs presents a conflict of interests. On the one hand
there is the feeling that the "rights of private government" 57 should not be
disturbed. Opposed to this is the degree of hardship that will be inflicted upon
the member by non-intervention where it is alleged that biased internal government necessitates an external adjudication. There is frequently a feeling that
the group will be the most helpful if it is allowed to work out its own lines of
development; that legal supervision may do more harm than good. Courts are
not qualified to prescribe details of government for the internal affairs of associations. 8 But in this particular problem of elections and controversies arising
in connectioAi with them, certain simple fundamentals could be regarded as principles by which unions were bound without depriving them of any legitimate right
of autonomy. The union members should have the right to have elections as
provided by the rules, or if they are not provided for by the rules, to have them
regardless, with the right to compel them in court without fear of penalty. There
should also be the right to participate in such elections, with resort to the courts
to gain the right if denied. There should be the further right that one may not
be disfranchised either by technicalities or by the error of others. There can be no
objection to judicial compulsion of stringent safeguards against coercion or
fraud. None of these rights should be able to be restricted in any case by constitution or by-laws of the union. Nor should penalties be permitted in any case
for enforcing any of such rights. Courts could well take jurisdiction in any
action where the complaint established a prima facie case of disregard of these
rights, regardless of exhaustion of remedy within the union, or of the contract
55. Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 858, 277 N. Y. Supp. 597, 6oi (Sup. Ct.
56. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note i5, at 131.
57. Amalgamated Society v. Jones, 29 T. L. R. 484, 485 (K. B. 1913).
58. Chafee, supra note 2o, at io2o et seq.

1932).
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theory, or of the existence of property rights. It is time for complete recognition
of the undoubted differences between the social club and those labor unions which
have an army of members, large resources and power, importance to the public,
economic significance, social significance, and political influence. The chief
similarity between social clubs and such unions is that both organizations have
always been given the same name-voluntary non-profit associations. Complete
recognition of these distinctions would in no way interfere with the internal
management or discipline that is needed within the union. The only thing
sought is a responsive management. It is not suggested that a more sympathetic
reaction by courts to election disputes within the union is a panacea for all intraorganization problems. The needs of any situation must rest upon a consideration of all its incidents. But a more ready willingness to intervene would provide a more satisfactory basis for solving many of the problems which have heretofore arisen.
C.E.H.

